UIC Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 3

Article 13

Spring 2006

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery is
Foreseeable, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1019 (2006)
Jeffrey Hoskins

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Common Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Litigation Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons,
and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Hoskins, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery is Foreseeable, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev.
1019 (2006)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss3/13
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS: RECOVERY IS FORESEEABLE
JEFFREY HOSKINS"

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Hearing about a child's accident can be almost as upsetting
as actually seeing it."' On January 5, 2000, seven-year-old Skylar
Wages was playing outside his parents' home when a car
negligently driven by Phillip Pegar struck and injured him.2 An
ambulance rushed Skylar and his mother, who was home at the
time, to the hospital.3 Skylar's father, Gerald Wages, was at work
during the incident and subsequently rushed to the hospital after
being informed of the accident by telephone.4 "Initially, Gerald got
a call saying that his son had been run over by a truck [and] [alt
that time, Skylar's medical condition was uncertain." Mr. Wages
filed an action against Pegar claiming negligent infliction of
emotional distress resulting from his son's injuries.'
" J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 2006. The author wishes to
thank
The John Marshall Law Review Board and Candidates for their editorial
work.
1. See Carmiel Sileo, Father Who Didn't See Son's Accident Can Sue For
Emotional Distress, 40 TRIAL 88 (2004) (stating that the Montana Supreme
Court recently allowed a father to sue for emotional distress after his son was
involved in an accident, even though the father did not witness the accident).
2. Wages v. First Nat'l Ins. Co., 79 P.3d 1095, 1096 (Mont. 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Brief of Appellant at 4, Wages v. First Nat'l Ins. Co., 79 P.3d 1095
(Mont. 2003) (No. 02-604) (stating that Skylar's "ability to be able to walk, to
run, to actively participate in school, and to live a normal child's life were all
in question.").
6. Wages, 79 P.3d at 1097. Skylar's injuries were extensive:
[He] experienced bilateral pelvic fractures and complete urethral
disruption.
He has undergone at least four major, invasive and
expensive surgical procedures since January 5, 2000, as well as
considerable physical therapy. Due to the extensive nature of Skylar's
urethra injury and the failure of surgery to correct the problem, Wages
has had to catherize his son between three and four times per day with
a large catheter tube.
Id. at 1096-7.
The court goes on to state that Skylar "is behind in his education due to
the accident and his ongoing medical treatment. His parents have noticed a
distinct change in his personality. Moreover, the prospect of his future ability

1019

1020

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1019

The Supreme Court of Montana reversed and remanded the
district court's denial of Wages' claim, concluding that recovery
must be based on whether the injury to Wages was foreseeable. 7
In doing so, the court followed its own precedent, in which it no
longer required the plaintiff to have witnessed the accident in
order to recover. The court ordered the district court to determine
if Wages' injury was foreseeable, and whether "'severe' or 'serious'
In determining if the
emotional distress could be found."9
emotional distress was serious and severe, the court applied the
standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §46.10
Although most jurisdictions require some sort of
observation of the injury-producing event, many are expanding
recovery to include bystander victims.1' Wages demonstrates that
it is now possible to recover on a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, even if the plaintiff failed to witness the

to participate in physical activities is questionable as is his ability to have
children." Id. at 1097.
7. Id. at 1100.
8. In a previous decision, the supreme court of Montana held that "[a]
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will arise under
circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was
the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent act or
omission." Sacco v. High County Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont.
1995). Therefore, the Wages court stated, "In Sacco, we severed the previously
mandatory nexus between witnessing the accident and foreseeablity, and
established that a defendant can owe a duty to a NIED claimant even in
circumstances where the claimant was not at the scene of the accident."
Wages, 79 P.2d at 1100.
9. Id. The court held that in determining if Wages was a foreseeable
plaintiff, "the court may consider such factors as the closeness of the
relationship between the plaintiff and victim, the age of the victim, and the
severity of the injury of the victim, and any other factors bearing on the
question." Id. The court stressed that "[iut may not, however, rely exclusively
on the fact that a plaintiff was not a bystander to conclude that such a
plaintiff is an unforeseeable plaintiff." Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965), states:

(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject
to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress
(a)to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at
the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress
results in bodily harm.
11. See James Podgers, Witness to Tragedy: Courts Open Door to More Suits
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 81 A.B.A. 44, (1995) (discussing
two court opinions from New Jersey and Wisconsin that have made it easier
for bystanders to recover).
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accident.'2 The only certain thing is that this area of law is
consistently inconsistent, with some jurisdictions following
"archaic [laws that do] not fully address all plaintiffs who are
deserving of relief.""
Courts, in order to maximize relief to
deserving plaintiffs, should adopt the foreseeability approach
when granting recovery.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of
bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. It
will explore the three methods courts use when determining
recovery: the physical impact test, the zone-of-danger test, and the
foreseeability test. Part III will explain the difference between
direct victims and bystander victims and explain why courts are
reluctant to expand bystander recovery. It will also discuss what
emotional distress encompasses and what standards the courts
use to measure its extent. Part IV will propose that courts adopt
the foreseeability test as the proper mode of recovery. Recent
court opinions will showcase how the foreseeability test is applied
and how courts use their discretion to grant deserving plaintiffs
relief.
II. BACKGROUND
Courts have long been hesitant to award damages to
individuals for purely mental distress absent a showing of physical
injury. 4 The fear was that if such claims were allowed, a "wide
door" might open and a "flood of litigation" could result.'5 Modern
courts "continue to foster judicial caution and doctrinal limitations
on recovery for emotional distress."" With the emergence of
bystander recovery, many courts remain "reluctant to allow

12. Wages, 79 P.2d at 1100.
13. See Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425 (recognizing the need for courts to utilize a
better approach when determining recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
14. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 55 (5thed. 1984). See also Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598 11 Eng.
Rep. 854 (1861) (stating that the law does not place a value on mental pain or
anxiety and will thus not reward damages for mental pain or anxiety when it
was caused solely by the negligent act).
15. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 56.
16. Id. at 360. Keeton then cites to Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E2d 171,
178-81, (Mass. 1982) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436A cmt. b
(1965) and writes that the concerns that the courts have are three fold:

(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often
temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of mental
harm will be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of
imposing heavy and disproportionate financial burdens upon a
defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences which
appear remote from the "wrongful act."
PROSSER, supra note 14, at 360-61 (citations omitted).

1022

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1019

recovery when physical injury is absent." 7 Today, there are three
prevailing views that courts follow in determining recovery: (1) the
physical impact rule, (2) the zone-of-danger rule, and (3) the
foreseeability test. 8
A.

The Physical Impact Rule

The requirement of direct physical impact can be traced back
to the English law in Victorian Railways Commissioners v.
In Victorian Railways Commissioners, the court
Coultas.9
dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress, because,
although they suffered fright, that fright was not accompanied by
Since Victorian Railways Commissioners,
physical injury.
American courts have also adopted the rule barring such claims. 0
Early courts applying the rule found that its application was
grounded in public policy and the general laws of torts." Under
the physical impact rule, a plaintiff may not recover unless the
individual suffered a "contemporaneous traumatic physical

17. See Lucy M. Romeo, A Case-By-Case Analysis: Connecticut Adopts the
Foreseeability Test for Bystander Emotional Distress in Clohessy v. Bachelor,
30 CONN. L. REV. 325, 325 (1997) (stating that progression of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress is moving more towards a
foreseeability analysis).
18. See Keith J. Wenk, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Liberalizing Recovery Beyond the Zone of Danger Rule, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
735, 735 (1984) (arguing that although the Supreme Court of Illinois
abandoned the physical impact rule and adopted the zone-of-danger rule, it
should have gone one step further and adopted the foreseeability test when
determining recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
19. 13 App. Cas. 222 (Eng. 1888). The plaintiffs suffered shock when a
gatekeeper negligently allowed them to cross a railroad track with an
oncoming train approaching. Id. Although the incident caused plaintiffs
fright, the fright alone, without accompanying physical injury, would not be
such that would normally flow from defendant's act, and thus recovery is not
allowed. Id.
20. See Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657, 662 (Ill. 1898) (holding that without
personal injury, there can be no recovery for the mere emotional distress
caused by another). Another American court held that, "[wie have not
been... able, after the most diligent research, to find any case, holding that
fright occasioned by imminent danger to one person, can be made the basis of
an action for damages by another." Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Stewart,
56 N.E. 917, 922 (Ind.Ct. App. 1900). Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts held that, "[wie remain satisfied with the rule that there can
be no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these
are unaccompanied by some physical injury .... " Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry.
Co., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897).
21. See Braun, 51 N.E. at 664 (holding that as a matter of public policy,
liability does not exist when mere fright or shock, absent physical impact,
produces emotional distress). See also Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 56 N.E.
at 919 (stating that under the laws of negligence, a party must prove
proximate causation and, by requiring a direct impact, the plaintiff has
established the absence of intervening acts).

2006]

Recovery is Foreseeable

1023

injury."22 The reason behind this requirement is in part due to the
fear that courts have concerning fraudulent claims. 3 In requiring
a direct physical impact, courts are attempting to limit such
fraudulent claims. 4
Although the physical impact rule has deep roots in American
jurisprudence, it no longer has the support of the majority of
scholars.25 Because of the broader requirements that aim to
increase the "fairness" of recovery, 26 most jurisdictions have
abandoned the physical impact requirement in favor of the zoneof-danger rule or a foreseeability test."

22. See Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Mo. 1983) (discussing the
reasons for the physical impact rule and the reasons for abandoning the rule).
23. Dennis G. Bassi, It's All Relative: A Graphical Reasoning Model For
LiberalizingRecovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Beyond the
Immediate Family, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 913, 922 (1996). See Bass, 646 S.W.2d
at 769 (stating further reasons for the rule include "the difficulty in proving a
causal connection between the damages claimed by the plaintiff and the act of
the defendant which is claimed to have induced the mental and emotional
distress.., and the probability that permitting recovery would release a flood
of new litigation... ").
24. Id. See Romeo, supra note 17, at 327 (stating that further policy
reasons behind the rule include "trivial claims should be eliminated... [and]
claims should not be speculative .. ").

25. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769. Indeed, not long after its acceptance in
America, writers criticized the physical impact rule:
The fallacies of the arguments by which the rule.., has been supported,
the essential reason of the rule, and the grave injustice of its application
have been so often exposed that it is high time our courts ...shall no
longer deny redress for... injury which is due to nervous shock caused
by fright.
Archibald H. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 260, 278
(1921).
The following illustration further demonstrates the scholarly criticism:
When the defendant leaves a truck, unattended and insufficiently
braked, at the top of a steep street, he negligently endangers the bodily
safety of persons coming up the street. .

.

. The fact that by a lucky

chance the plaintiff escaped [being] ...run over directly by the truck...
is not a sufficient reason for urging that [the defendant] ought not pay
for... [the] nervous shock induced by fear for the safety of another also
endangered by the approaching truck.
Calvert Magruder, Mental Disturbancein Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033, 103637 (1936) (citations omitted).
26. The impact requirement can be met by "a slight blow, a trivial jolt or
jar, a forcible seating on the floor, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke."
PROSSER, supra note 14, at 363-64 (citations omitted). "A Georgia circus case
reduced the matter to something of an absurdity by finding 'impact' where the
defendant's horse 'evacuated his bowels' into the plaintiffs lap." Id. at 364
(citations omitted).
27. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769. For a further analysis, see Romeo, supra note
17, at 328. Romeo maintains that the physical impact rule has accomplished
little of what its purpose is behind the rule. Id.
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The Zone-of-DangerRule

As a result of the injustice of the physical impact test, 28 many
states have adopted the zone-of- danger test as an alternative.
Under this rule, "a bystander who is in a zone of physical danger
and who, because of the defendant's negligence, has reasonable
fear for his own safety is given a right of action for physical injury
or illness resulting from emotional distress."" The premise behind
the zone-of-danger rule is that the defendant owes a duty to the
bystander, and as a result of his negligence, the defendant has
Similarly, the zone-of-danger rule is
breached that duty.31
supported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §436. 32
Although the zone-of-danger test seems to allay courts'
worries about unreasonably extending liability, its application can
leave deserving plaintiffs without a remedy.33 Therefore, courts
28. See Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769-70 (discussing numerous reasons for
abandoning the physical impact rule, including the "unfairness" and "inequity"
of the rule, and discussing the weaknesses behind the arguments in favor of
the rule).
29. Wenk, supra note 18, at 739. See Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163,
1165 (Colo. 1978) (stating that the court is following the majority of
jurisdictions and adopting the Restatement approach by no longer requiring a
physical impact prior to recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
See also Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709, 714-715 (Del. 1965)
(abandoning the physical impact rule in favor of the zone-of-danger rule in the
belief that justice is better served using the latter). See also Rickey v. CTA,
457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (finding that courts were applying the physical
impact rule as a mere formality, and thus the better approach to recovery is
the zone-of-danger test). See also Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d
109, 112 (Ohio 1983) (stating that the arguments in favor of the physical
impact requirement no longer validate the court's continued reliance on the
rule when determining recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
30. See Rickey, 457 N.E.2d at 5 (holding that "the bystander... must have
been in such proximity to the accident in which the direct victim was
physically injured that there was a high risk to him of physical impact.").
31. Romeo, supra note 17, at 328. Additionally, the defendant breaches a
duty owed to the plaintiff when he or she unreasonably places the plaintiff in
danger and, as such, the plaintiff should recover damages including damages
caused by seeing a family member also placed in danger because of the
defendant's conduct. Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847 (N.Y. 1984).
32. Sections 2 and 3 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §436 (1965)
state:
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to
fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the
fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright
or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to
the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of
his immediate family occurring in his presence.
33. See Engler v. Wehmas, 633 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that although the plaintiff mother was within the zone of danger and saw her
son fly ten feet in the air after being hit by a car, she was nonetheless denied
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that have abandoned the zone-of-danger test as well as the
physical impact test have used a form of the foreseeability test
when determining bystander recovery."'
C. The ForeseeabilityTest
Perhaps the most widely known jurisdiction to abandon the
zone-of-danger test in favor of a new standard of recovery is
California, in the landmark case, Dillon v. Legg.35 In Dillon, the
plaintiff mother filed a cause of action against the defendant for
emotional trauma including "great emotional disturbance and
shock and injury to her nervous system" from witnessing a car
accident in which the defendant collided with the plaintiffs infant
daughter.36 In addition to the mother, the victim's sister also
brought a claim against the driver on the ground that she "was in
close proximity to the... collision and personally witnessed said
[and as a result] sustained great emotional
collision...
",37
disturbance and shock and injury to her nervous system ....
The lower court rejected the mother's claim because although she
witnessed the accident, she was not within the zone of danger.38
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California recognized the
"fallacy" of the zone-of-danger rule and abandoned it in favor of a
foreseeability test.39
recovery). There was a strong dissent in this opinion arguing for recovery
because "plaintiff was in the zone of danger. She reasonably feared for her
own safety. She suffered severe emotional distress that was the product of
fear for herself or the safety of a family member." Id. at 874.
34. See Patrick F. X. Santel, Bystanders' Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims in Washington State: Must You Be Present to Win?, 23
SEAYILE U. L. REV. 769, 772 (2000) (stating that courts began recognizing
claims from plaintiffs who were neither themselves injured nor endangered by
See also Renee Birnbaum, Negligence Law:
the defendant's conduct).
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Under What Circumstances Can
Relief Be Found?, 83 MICH. BAR J. 18, 20 (2004) (stating that Michigan has
abandoned the physical impact rule and subsequently recognized the 'hopeless
artificiality' of the zone-of-danger rule).
35. See generally 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968) (abandoning the "zone-ofdanger" test).
36. Id. at 914.
37. Id.
38. The lower court relied on two previous California decisions. First, the
lower court agreed that "[n]o cause of action is stated in [the] allegation that
plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or shock induced by apprehension
of negligently caused danger...." Id. at 914-15 (quoting Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963). Second, the court also agreed
that no cause of action is stated "unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff
suffered emotional distress, fright or shock as a result of fear for his own
safety." Id. at 915 (quoting Reed v. Moore, 319 P.2d 80 (Cal. 1957)).
39. The court stated:
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the [zone-of-danger] rule that
would deny recovery in the one situation and grant it in the other. In
the first place, we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which
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In determining whether the plaintiff had a right to recover,
the Dillon court applied the general rules of tort law. ' First, the
court noted that the plaintiff could not recover if she was found to
have acted in a contributorily negligent manner.4 Second, the
court turned to the concept of duty and recognized "that an action
for negligence would lie only if the defendant breached a duty
which he owed to plaintiff."2 The court further noted that when
deciding if the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, the primary
factor will be the foreseeability of risk.'
While the degree of
foreseeability is measured on a case-by-case basis," the following
factors are used to aid the court in its determination:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship."
Applying these factors, the court determined that the mother
had a proper cause of action and her emotional distress was
foreseeable.'
Following the Dillon decision, there were numerous court
holdings that expanded the guidelines to allow greater recovery for
bystander victims." In general, the guidelines were relaxed and
she suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it to
the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was some
few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless
artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.
Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915.
40. Id. at 924. The court stated that it should follow its approach to other
forms of injury and therefore apply negligence concepts to the present case,
including the theories of proximate cause and foreseeability. Id.
41. Id. at 916.
42. Id. at 917.

43. Id. at 920. The court stated that "the chief element in determining
whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the

foreseeability of the risk .... Because it is inherently intertwined with
foreseeability such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only
upon a case-by-case basis." Id.
44. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
45. Id. at 920.
46. Id. at 921. The court stated that "the presence of all the above factors
indicates that plaintiff has alleged a sufficient prima facie case. Surely the
negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect
that the mother will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident
suffer emotional trauma." Id.
47. See Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(holding that a mother could recover because she arrived on the scene shortly
after the accident and witnessed the injuries to her son). See also Krouse v.
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courts "allowed recovery more frequently."
Fearing that the
continued application of the guidelines in Dillon would result in
limitless liability, the California Supreme Court handed down
49
Thing v. LaChusa.
In Thing, a mother was denied recovery for
the emotional distress she suffered after a negligent driver struck
and injured her child because she was not present at the scene of
the accident."0 The Thing court limited the Dillon guidelines and
held that a bystander can recover for negligent infliction of
emotional distress only if the plaintiff:
(1)is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware
that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers
serious emotional distress - a reaction beyond that which would be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal
response to the circumstances. 5'
D. The Problem
As these three primary standards demonstrate, "[ciourts have
been particularly concerned that some appropriate boundaries
exist for negligent infliction of emotional distress to minimize

Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1977) (finding that although the plaintiff
did not "contemporaneously observe" his wife's accident, he was deemed a
"percipient witness" by the fact that he knew where his wife was immediately
before the accident and therefore must have known that the defendant's car
struck her). See also Nazaroff v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 145
Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that plaintiff may have a
cause of action from the "contemporaneous observation" of the immediate
consequences of defendant's act).
48. See Stephen C. Peretz and Gayle D. Perlo, Bystander Recovery: Ruling

Within the Guidelines, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 517, 519 (1992) (stating that
although recovery was expanding, the lower courts began adding their own
prerequisites to the Dillon guidelines, seemingly moving away from their
original form). In their comment, Peretz and Perlo recognize that California
moved back to the Dillon requirements when they decided Ochoa v. Superior
Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985) writing, "In Ochoa, the court 'explicitly removed
several barriers to recovery which [had] been used in conjunction with Dillon."'
Id. at 519-20 (quoting Kathleen K. Andrews, The Next Best Thing to Being
There?: Foreseeabilityof Media-Assisted Bystanders, 17 SW. U. L. REV. 65, 71
(1987)).

49. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). The Thing court was worried that liability
based on a case-by-case analysis of foreseeablity would result in "limitless
liability out of all proportion to the degree of a defendant's negligence . ..
."
Id. at 826. The court also found that the Dillon analysis resulted in unclear
and "inconsistent rulings in the lower courts." Id. at 825.
50. Id. at 830. Although the mother arrived immediately after the accident,
the court further based its holding on the fact that "[sihe did not observe
defendant's conduct and was not aware that her son was being injured." Id.
51. Id. at 829-30.
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spurious claims and to limit the potential liability of defendants."52
However, as a result of the refinements in this field, there is vast
uncertainty among both attorneys and their clients as to whether
a successful cause of action lies.53 Ultimately, many courts have
abandoned both the physical impact requirement and the zone-ofdanger test in favor of a foreseeability analysis.'
III. ANALYSIS
A. Bystander Victims v. Direct Victims
With the rise of bystander recovery, courts are now required
to make a distinction between claims for emotional distress
brought by actual bystanders, as that term is used, and direct
victims."
Burgess v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County'
contains an example of the difference between bystander victims
and direct victims. In Burgess, the plaintiff mother, Julia Burgess,
brought a suit against defendants, Dr. Narendra Gupta and West
Covina Hospital, for negligent infliction of emotional distress
resulting from the negligent delivery of Burgess's child.57 During
birth, the child was deprived of oxygen for roughly forty-four
52. See Podgers, supra note 11 (recognizing the extreme emotional distress
that results when a loved one is severely injured in an accident and
acknowledging that it is the purpose of the law to draw boundaries and impose
restrictions on who is able to recover and how much compensation the victim
should receive).
53. See Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress UnderRule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), or Refinements Thereof, 96
A.L.R.5th 107 (2004) (discussing in detail the various standards used to
determine recovery and how courts in separate jurisdictions apply those
standards to their cases).
54. Some examples include Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517
N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994); Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983);
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d
193 (Wyo. 1986).
55. See, e.g., Michael Jay Gorback, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Has the Legislative Response to Diane Whipple's Death Rendered the
Hard-line Stance of Elden and Thing Obsolete?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 273, 288-89
(2002) (stating the courts used the physical impact test and the zone-of-danger
test under the premise that recovery should be limited to direct victims;
however, the emergence of bystander recovery has required courts to make a
distinction between the two).
56. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
57. Id. at 1198-99. The father of the child, Joseph Moody, also brought suit
to recover for emotional distress; however, the trial court dismissed his suit
when he failed to comply with discovery requests. Id. at 1199. In dicta, the
California Supreme Court noted that an amicus brief was filed raising the
question of whether a father in such a situation can recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1199 n.4. However, since the trial court
dismissed his suit, this court declined to decide that issue in the present case.
Id. at 1199.
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minutes as a result of a prolapsed umbilical cord.' After the child
was born, "he suffered permanent brain and nervous system
damage, allegedly as a result of the deprivation of oxygen. " "
At trial, defendants brought a motion for summary judgment
arguing that Burgess is not entitled to recover because she did not
"contemporaneously observe" the child's injuries.' The trial court
relied upon the holding of Thing and granted the motion." On
appeal the court reversed, holding that "Thing was not controlling
under the facts presented by this case, because Burgess was a
'direct victim' rather than a 'bystander."'6 2
In Burgess, the court recognized that the physician-patient
relationship creates a duty of care and further recognized that an
obstetrician and an expectant mother enter into a strong physical
and emotional relationship.' Therefore, "[any negligence during
delivery which causes injury to the fetus and resultant emotional
anguish to the mother... breaches a duty owed directly to the
mother.'
"[Tihe label 'direct victim' arose... as a result of a breach of
duty owed the plaintiff that is 'assumed by the defendant or

58. Id. at 1199. The court noted that "approximately 21 minutes elapsed
between the time that [Dr.] Gupta diagnosed the cord prolapse and the time
Burgess was taken to emergency surgery." Id. at 1198. Burgess testified that
during this time Dr. Gupta was "in and out" of her room and yelled at her to
"'[b]reathe, breathe, because your baby ain't getting enough oxygen.'" Id.
59. Id. at 1199. The child was eventually released from the hospital a
month after birth. Id. The court further noted that the child died, "allegedly
as the result of his injuries," while the trial was in process. Id.
60. Id. The defendants based their argument on bystander liability and the
previous decision by the California Supreme Court in Thing, and urged the
court that because there was a lack of contemporaneous observation of the
injury, there was not a valid bystander claim. Id.
61. Id. As stated earlier, the Thing court established a bright-line rule
where recovery is allowed only when the plaintiff and victim are closely
related, the plaintiff is present at the scene, the plaintiff is aware the incident
is causing injury, and suffers serious emotional distress. Thing, 771 P.2d at
829-30.
62. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199. The court relied on two primary cases:
Christensen v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 820 P.2d 181 (Ca. 1991)
(stating that plaintiffs seeking emotional distress were deemed direct victims
of improperly performed funeral services) and Marlene F. v. Affiliated
Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278 (Ca. 1989) (finding a mother a
direct victim after her son was sexually assaulted by a therapist).
63. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1203. The court discussed the realities of
childbirth. It mentioned that the obstetrician is aware of the physical and
emotional connection between a mother and her fetus. Id. It further
mentioned how mothers often forgo all anesthesia out of concern for the wellbeing of the future child and that the obstetrician is aware that, regardless of
any pain, childbirth is the most joyous experience for mothers. Id.
64. Id. Finally, the court stated that once it is understood that there is a
breach of physician-patient duty, this case becomes a mere professional
malpractice claim for which recovery is warranted. Id.
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imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a
relationship between the two."'' 5 The essential analysis that
courts look at in determining if one is a direct victim versus a
bystander is the "source of the duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff."' Ultimately, in direct victim cases, successful recoveries
for negligently inflicted emotional distress result when a
defendant breaches a preexisting duty owed to the plaintiff,
regardless of whether the plaintiff is labeled a bystander."
B. The Serious and Severe Emotional Distress Requirement
As discussed earlier, although courts may employ different
methods to establish valid claims for emotional distress,' the
similarity between them is that in order to recover, the emotional
distress must be serious and severe.69 When the Supreme Court of
Connecticut adopted the foreseeability test in Clohessy v.
Bachelor," the court held that a bystander's "emotional injury
must be serious, beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness and which is not the result of an abnormal
response."7 In Clohessy, the plaintiff mother brought a suit to
recover for the emotional distress she suffered after witnessing
defendant's automobile negligently strike and kill her son."2 The
65. Id. at 1201 (quoting Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic,
Inc. 770 P.2d 278, 282 (Cal. 1989)).
66. Id. at 1200. The court recognized that the concept of duty in direct
victim cases arises from a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant, whereas in bystander cases, there lacks that preexisting
relationship, and the defendant assumes no "duty of care beyond that owed to
the public in general." Id. at 1200-01.
67. Id. at 1201.
68. See supra notes 19-51 and accompanying text (discussing the three
main standards courts use to establish claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
69. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30 (holding that the distress must be greater
than that suffered by a disinterested witness). See also Wages, 79 P.3d at
1098 (stating that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 should be used
as the standard to determine the seriousness of the distress).
70. 675 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1996).
71. Id. at 865. In reaching its opinion, the court relied on precedent from
other courts adopting the same standard. See Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality
Ventures of Asheville, 435 S.E.2d 320, 322 (N.C. 1993)(quoting Johnson v.
Ruark Obstetrics, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990))(holding that "plaintiff must
show an 'emotional or mental disorder, such as ...neurosis, psychosis, chronic
depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals'... ."). See also Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio
1983) (holding that "serious emotional distress may be found where a
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately
with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.").
72. See Clohessy, 675 A.2d at 854, n.2 (stating that the decedent's minor
brother, Liam Clohessy, through his father, John Patrick Clohessy, also
brought suit for his resulting emotional distress from witnessing the accident).
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court found that it was reasonable to foresee that a mother would
suffer serious emotional distress in such a situation and held that
a valid bystander claim existed.73
74
Conversely, in Fitch v. Milford Power Co.,
the court found
that plaintiffs, Michael Fitch and Robert Fitch III, failed to state a
valid bystander claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress."5 The plaintiffs brought the claim after witnessing their
father trapped in a crane for several hours. 7' As a result of
witnessing the accident, the brothers complained of suffering from
nightmares, resulting in sleeping difficulty.77 However, after the
accident, the plaintiffs missed no work, were not diagnosed with
emotional disorders, and continued to live normal, everyday lives."8
The court held that "[diespite the indisputably traumatic effect
their father's injury has had on their lives

...[the]

accident would

have been traumatic to even a disinterested person and having
nightmares about such an event would be a normal response to
these circumstances."79 Ultimately, the court held that plaintiffs'
emotional distress was not serious and severe and therefore
denied recovery."
1.

MeasuringEmotional Distress

Before courts can measure a plaintiffs emotional distress, the
evidence must demonstrate that the defendant's negligence was
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.8 Often, this inquiry
comes down to the question of whether defendant owed plaintiff a
duty.82 Once proximate cause is established, emotional distress is

73. See id. at 865 (determining that all requirements of the claim are met,
including relation to the victim, contemporaneous sensory perception, and

substantial injury to the victim).
74. 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 601 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
75. See id. (requiring a foreseeability analysis similar to that in Dillon,
including close relation to the victim, contemporaneous sensory perception,
substantial injury to the victim, and serious emotional distress).
76. See id. (recognizing that the plaintiffs stated in their claim that the
Heat Recovery Steam Generator fell on their father as he worked at the
Milford Power Company).
77. See id. (arguing that their emotional distress is serious and severe,

Michael and Robert also claimed that they suffered anger and frustration as
well as weight gain).
78. See id. (recognizing that bystander claims exist when the emotional
distress is serious, the court determined that neither plaintiff suffered a

"debilitating emotional reaction" that rises to the necessary level of a valid
claim).

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See PROSSER, supra note 14, at 272-73 (explaining the difficulty that
courts and juries have over the term proximate cause, but suggesting that

"legal cause" or "responsible cause" are close synonyms).
82. Id. at 273.
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often described in terms of terror, anxiety, depression, worry, as
well as personality changes.u
The actual measure of the extent of the emotional distress is
often difficult to determine because no clear standard exists.' In
his treatise on remedies, Dobbs states, "[blecause the award for
pain does not reflect economic loss, it is difficult to establish
standards of measurement. [Therefore] ... courts have rejected
the 'Golden Rule' measurement under which the jury would be told
to award an amount they would personally take to undergo the
plaintiffs injuries. " ' Dobbs concludes that courts are content to
simply allow the jury to decide on a measurement that results in
"fair compensation" or a "reasonable amount."'

C. Arguments Against Expansion
As noted earlier, courts are consistently worried about
expanding bystander recovery because of the perceived effects on
the legal system. 7 Although most jurisdictions have completely
abolished the physical impact requirement,8 many are reluctant to
abandon the zone-of-danger rule in favor of a foreseeability test.89
The following sections will explain some of those fears and how
courts react to them.
1.

Fearof Limitless Liability

Opponents of expanding the method of recovery for
bystanders in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases argue
that doing so will result in limitless liability.'
In Tobin v.

83. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION,
652-54, (2d ed. 1993) (stating that any emotional reaction to a tort, as long as
the plaintiff can prove proximate causation, is a basis for which the courts
may award compensation to the victim).
84. See id. at 383 (recognizing the difficulty in establishing a common
standard because of the bias that certain juries may have and the lack of a
"market value" on suffering).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. See id. (stating that because there is no real standard of measurement,
review of the jury's award is often difficult).
87. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 56.
88. See supra notes 25-27 (explaining the arguments against the physical
impact rule).
89. See Wenk, supra note 18 (explaining the reasons that Illinois opted to
follow the zone-of- danger rule as opposed to applying a foreseeability test).
90. See Engler, 633 N.W.2d at 872 (discussing that Minnesota applies the
zone-of-danger test as the method of recovery because a negligent defendant
must not be subject to unlimited liability). See also Bassi, supra note 23, at
945-46 (recognizing that the arguments against expanding bystander recovery
include the idea that liability must be limited). See also Thing, 771 P.2d at
821 (stating that a pure foreseeability test would result in "limitless
exposure").
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Grossman,"1 the Court of Appeals of New York stated that "[e]very
injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the
waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree."' In Tobin, the
court denied recovery to a mother after her child was injured when
the defendant negligently struck the child with an automobile.93
Although New York eventually adopted the zone-of-danger test,94
the Tobin court clearly made its point, stating that "[tlhis is the
risk of living and bearing children."95
Another fear is that such limitless liability will result in
disastrous consequences to defendants.'
Imposing limits on
liability is one way courts hope to avoid such grave consequences
to defendants.97
In Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp.," the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts feared that expanding
bystander recovery to non-relative victims would result in
"excessive liability."9' The court denied the plaintiff's claim for
emotional distress after the plaintiff came upon and attempted to
help an individual who had been negligently struck by defendant's
van.'
Regarding the rationale behind denying the claim and thus
limiting liability, the court quoted Chief Justice Cardozo, stating
91. 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
92. Id. at 424.
93. See id. (denying recovery because at the time of this case, New York did
not allow recovery for mere emotional distress absent a showing of direct
physical injury to the plaintiff-the physical impact rule).
94. See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 850 (N.Y. 1984)(holding that a
mother and daughter have valid claims of emotional distress after witnessing
their husband/father in a car accident. In the same appeal the court held that
a mother and father had a valid claim of emotional trauma after witnessing
their daughter in a car accident. Both cases presented situations where the
plaintiffs were in the zone of danger).
95. Tobin, 249 N.E. 2d at 424.
96. See Santel, supra note 34, at 770 (arguing that expansion will require
defendants to compensate for indirect losses and the compensation will be
open-ended). See also Richard L. Abel, What We Know and Do Not Know
About the Impact of Civil Justice on the American Economy and Policy: Judges
Write the Darndest Things: Judicial Mystification of Limitations on Tort
Liability, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1560 (2002) (recognizing that courts place
limits on recovery because of the effect that liability would have on the
defendant).
97. See Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp. 690 N.E.2d 413, 414 (Mass.
1998)(recognizing that courts must place limits in terms of the class of
plaintiffs that can recover as well as the type of injuries for which plaintiffs
may obtain compensation).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 415. The court recognizes that limits on recovery are utilized
more to place limits on potential liability than on "grounds of fairness or other
imperatives of corrective justice." Id. at 416.
100. Id. at 414. The court discussed both liability under a bystander theory
and liability under a rescuer doctrine because the evidence is unclear on
whether the plaintiff saw the accident or arrived shortly thereafter. Id.
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that if recovery were allowed, the defendant would be exposed to
"a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time
to an indeterminate class."'
2.

FearOver a Floodgate of Litigation

Another concern courts have over expansion of bystander
recovery is that doing so will open a floodgate of litigation. 12
Courts are concerned that plaintiffs will bring suits based on every
imaginable mental harm they may suffer.l" The fear of a flood of
litigation is not new and can be traced back to the English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright.'4 In Winterbottom, the court held that
only parties to a contract may bring suit; otherwise there would be
"no limit to such actions." 5 The court further stated that if it
were to allow recovery "one step beyond that, there is no reason
why we should not go fifty.""
Similarly, prior to abandoning the impact rule, Pennsylvania
courts feared that allowing recovery to bystander victims would
inundate their courts with claims that previously lacked
justiciability."'7 In Knaub v. Gotwalt,l° the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a mother, father, and sister could not
recover on a claim of mental shock and anguish after witnessing a
driver hit a family member, because doing so would result in a
"virtual avalanche of cases" and cause "chaos" in the area of
negligence law." The court reasoned that allowing such claims

101. Id. at 418 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E.
441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)).
102. See Francis X. Clinch and Jodie L. Johnson, Compensation of Emotional
Distress in Montana: Distinctions Between Bystanders and Direct Victims, 47
MONT. L. REV. 479, 482 (1986) (explaining that the fear of a floodgate of
litigation was a strong argument for the physical impact rule; however, courts
that have abandoned that rule have not seen a flood of litigation).
103. See Jon L. Gillum, Fear of Disease in Another Person: Assessing the
Merits of an Emerging Tort Claim, 79 TEX. L. REV. 227, 233-34 (2000) (stating
that the fear of a floodgate of litigation argument is analogous to a "slipperyslope" argument and thus courts have employed bright-line rules in attempts
to alleviate that fear).
104. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (E.P. 1842). See also Robert L. Rabin, The Duty
Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787, 799-800 (2001)
(discussing the historical nexus between liability and the concerns courts have
in preventing a flood of litigation).
105. See Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403 (finding that if parties outside
of contracts were allowed to sue, it would result in alarming consequences for
which the court can find no precedent).
106. Id. at 405.
107. See Bosley v. Andrews, 142 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. 1958) (stating that courts
would open a "Pandora's box" if recovery were allowed for mental injury
absent physical harm).
108. 220 A.2d 646 (Pa. 1966).
109. Id. at 647-48.
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would promote both "normal" and "nervous" people to believe they
suffered emotional shock from any unexpected event.11 °
3. Fearof FraudulentClaims
Finally, because emotional distress is often difficult to
determine,'11 courts are reluctant to expand recovery due to a fear
that plaintiffs will falsify their injuries.' Also, critics suggest that
the difficulty in determining valid negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims arises from the fact that such claims are often
difficult to prove or measure." 3 As stated earlier, the requirement
of a physical impact prior to recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was a direct attempt to limit fraudulent
claims."'
For example, in Elden v. Sheldon,"' the Supreme Court of
California denied relief to a bystander who witnessed the injury
and death of the individual with whom he was living, but was not
his wife."6 The court recognized the increase in non-married
couples living together and establishing emotional bonds that are
as strong as those shared by married couples, and yet was
reluctant to expand recovery." 7 The court stated that the reasons
for dismissal of plaintiffs suit included the state's strong interest
in marriage, the need to limit recovery, and the fear of fraudulent
claims."8 The burden imposed on the court system by allowing

110. See id. at 647 (recognizing that the court also feared that medical
science would be unable to prove that the emotional trauma the individual
plaintiffs believed they suffered was actually caused by defendant's
negligence).
111. See Santel, supra note 34, at 792 (stating that courts fear that juries
will be unable to distinguish valid claims of emotional distress from
fraudulent claims).
112. Id.
113. See Douglas A. Terry, Don't Forget About Reciprocal Altruism: Critical
Review of the Evolutionary Jurisprudence Movement, 34 CONN. L. REV. 477,
495 (2002) (stating that courts recognize that mental claims are more difficult
to prove and measure than pure physical injuries, and because of that they
have used varying approaches when awarding recovery).
114. Wenk, supra note 18, at 737. See also Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander
Emotional Distress:Missing an Opportunityto Strengthen the Ties That Bind,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1419 (1995) (recognizing that New York employed the
physical impact requirement until 1961 in an attempt to limit fraudulent
claims).
115. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 585-86 (stating that there is no doubt that non-married,
cohabitating couples live lives similar to that of married couples, including
sharing expenses, resources, and emotions and that injury to one will result in
emotional trauma to the other).
118. See id. at 586-88 (stating that allowing a claim would also require the
court to delve deep into every relationship which would result in a "massive
intrusion" into the private lives of these individuals).

1036

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:1019

recovery in situations such as this, the court reasoned, was too
great.1 9 Ultimately, allowing recovery in this instance, the court
feared, would invite "mischief' and "difficult problems of proof' in
determining if a relationship was the equivalent of a marriage. 2 '
IV. PROPOSAL
Courts should adopt only the foreseeability test when
determining recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
for bystander victims. There is no question in today's legal system
that bystanders have a right to recover, and the majority of courts
already utilize a foreseeability analysis in granting recovery."'
Courts must no longer deny relief to deserving plaintiffs because of
fear that the legal system will be unduly burdened.'
In addition,
with the advancement of medical science, courts are able to
adequately differentiate between valid claims and fraudulent
claims. 2 ' The remainder of this Comment will analyze why the
foreseeability approach should be followed and the limits that
must be placed on it in order to have effective adjudication.
A.

The Fearof Unduly Burdening the Legal System Is Without
Merit

When California first applied the foreseeability test, it
emphasized that the hardships on the judicial system must not
prevent compensation for wrongs committed. 24 Also, as Dean
Prosser once stated, "it is the business of the law to remedy
wrongs that deserve it... and it is a pitiful confession of
incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon
the ground that it will give the court too much work to do." 2'
119. Id.
120. See id. at 587 (stating that plaintiff argued that the nature and
seriousness of the relationship could be shown through circumstantial
evidence; however, the court dismisses those suggestions).
121. See Romeo, supra note 17, at 346 (recognizing the viability of bystander
recovery and stating that Connecticut follows the majority of jurisdictions in
applying a foreseeability analysis to determine if victims have a successful
action).
122. See supra notes 89-118 and accompanying text (discussing the main
arguments that jurisdictions have against using a foreseeability approach,
including the fear of limitless liability, the fear of a floodgate of litigation, and
the fear of fraudulent claims).
123. When the California Supreme Court first recognized bystander recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Dillon, they stated, in dicta,
that with medical knowledge there is "no distinction. .. between physical
injury and emotional injury flowing from the physical injury.. .. " Dillon, 441
P. 2d at 920 n.5.
124. "Yet we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle
that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong." Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919.
125. Romeo, supra note 17, at 344 (quoting William L. Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 877 (1939)).
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The judicial system has not been excessively burdened in the
jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability approach. 2 ' For
example, Montana applies the foreseeability approach and has not
experienced an increase in fraudulent claims, a flood of litigation,
or unlimited liability. 21 7 Similarly, Connecticut has successfully
adopted the foreseeability test without incurring such burdens."u
In fact, the fears that courts have expressed regarding the
foreseeability approach have largely not occurred."u
B. Medical Science and EmotionalDistress
The use of medical science will aid courts in their
determination of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 3 ' By using advancements in scientific technology, courts
are able to better distinguish between fraudulent claims and valid
claims, thus alleviating that major fear. 3 ' Further, requiring a
physical impact in order to recover because of a fear of fraudulent
been deemed unnecessary in light of modern
claims has all but
32
medical science.
An example of a court trumpeting the value of medical science
in the field of bystander liability is Sinn v. Burd 3 3 In Sinn, the
mother was on her porch when she witnessed a car negligently
The
collide with her daughter, causing her daughter's death.'

126. See Sacco, 896 P.2d at 418-19 (arguing that the courts' fears over
fraudulent claims, floodgates of litigation, and unlimited liability have not
been experienced, and by imposing narrow rules on recovery, deserving
plaintiffs get nothing).
127. Id.
128. See Clohessy, 675 A.2d at 860-61 (stating that for public policy reasons
the court is adopting the foreseeability test over the zone-of-danger test).
129. See Romeo, supra note 17, at 344 (stating that while the fears may
remain, they have not been realized).
130. See Meredith A. Moore, South Dakota's Interpretation of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress and The "Zone of Danger"Rule in Nielson v.
AT&T Corporation: A Dangerous Hybrid, 45 S.D. L. REV. 379, 394-95
(recognizing that courts are concerned with the difficulty of determining the
extent of the emotional distress suffered, but the advancement of medical
science has enhanced the ability of courts to rule on these claims).
131. See id. at 395 (stating that although medical science will not eliminate
fraudulent claims entirely, and thus some fear will inevitably remain,
technology decreases the potential for fraud and allows courts a better
opportunity to deal with these cases).
132. See Anthony Fernandez, Bystander Liability - Unmarried Cohabitants
May Satisfy the "Intimate Familial Relationship" Element of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Where They Have a Stable, Enduring,
Substantial Relationship with Strong Emotional Bonds and Deep Emotional
Security, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, n.10 (stating that authorities no longer
see the purpose of the physical impact rule due to the fact that medical science
has firmly established that mental distress is an injury in itself).
133. 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979).
134. Id. at 674.
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mother filed an action for emotional distress resulting from
witnessing the collision.'35 The court held that the mother had a
valid claim and that her injury was reasonably foreseeable. 3 '
The Sinn court relied on the advancement of medical science
as a way to prove the "causal link between the psychic damage
suffered by the bystander and the shock or fright attendant to
having witnessed the accident." 37 The court noted that the use of
medical science lessens the chance of a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim being "intangible, untrustworthy,
illusory, and speculative."' 38
C. The ForeseeabilityTest Used in Conjunction with the Court's
Discretion
While the zone-of-danger test or the physical impact test may
place a strict standard on recovery and give courts a sense of
certainty, the foreseeability test also places limits on recovery, yet
gives courts discretion to make sound decisions. 9
While the
foreseeability approach should be modeled around the three
standards adopted in Dillon - (1) plaintiff located near the scene of
the accident, (2) contemporaneous observation, and (3)close
relation to the victim 40 - courts must use their discretion to allow
just recovery."
In Marzolf v. Stone,' the Supreme Court of
Washington followed a foreseeability approach in granting
recovery to bystander victims, yet applied the guidelines to fit the
facts of the case at hand. 3 The court stated that limiting recovery
to a bright-line rule "is attractive in its simplicity. However, it

135. Id. In addition to the claim for emotional distress, the mother also
brought claims under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts. Id. The
deceased sister also brought a separate claim for emotional distress from

watching her sister die. Id.
136. Id. at 686. The court applied the foreseeability test enacted in Dillon:
plaintiff located at the scene, contemporaneous observation of accident, and
close relation of plaintiff and victim. Id. at 685.
137. See id. at 678 (stating that cases dealing with negligent infliction of

emotional distress have not kept up with the medical field and concerns over
causal proof should no longer deny claims).
138. Id. (citing Huston v. Fremansburg, 61 A. 1022 (1905)).
139. Id. at 683-84 (arguing that because the foreseeability test places limits
on recovery, the fear of unlimited liability is displaced).
140. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
141. See Marzolf v. Stone, 960 P.2d 424 (1998) (holding that plaintiff can

recover for emotional distress suffered after arriving at the scene of the
accident shortly after the injury causing event occurred and yet before a

substantial change in the victim's condition).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 426 (stating that the victim's father arrived at the accident
scene roughly ten minutes after the injury-causing event and before
paramedics arrived to see his son, who died shortly thereafter, in severely

critical condition).
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draws an arbitrary line that serves to exclude plaintiffs without
meaningful distinction."'
With the increase in non-married cohabitants as well as the
general debate surrounding marriage in today's society, the
foreseeability approach will allow courts to use their discretion
when deserving plaintiffs are injured. For example, in Graves v.
Estabrook,14 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire extended
bystander liability to a woman who witnessed the collision and
death of her fianc6 and as a result suffered severe emotional
distress. 141 While not yet related by blood or marriage, the
relationship between the couple satisfied the other factors of the
foreseeability approach. 1'7 The court recognized that the outcome
of following a bright-line rule of recovery would not justify the
In granting recovery, the court noted that
facts of this case.'
betrothed individuals have a bond similar to that of marriage.'49
Finally, in working within the boundaries established in Dillon,
but applying its discretion, the court stated: "[tihe appropriate
but rather to use
analysis is not to resort to a dictionary definition
" 150
our traditional analysis of foreseeability.
While courts in their discretion are able to grant recovery to
For example,
deserving plaintiffs, boundaries must be drawn.'
there must be a relation between the victim and the plaintiff that
rivals that of blood. In Graves, the court described such factors as
"the duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual
dependence, the extent of common contributions to a life together,
the extent and quality of shared experience, whether the plaintiff
and the [victim] were members of the same household, [and] their
emotional reliance on each other. ... ."" This prevents the

144. See id. at 428-29 (arguing that emotional distress flows from both
witnessing a relative's accident as well as seeing the relative severely injured
at the scene).
145. 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H 2003).
146. See id. at 1257 (stating that the plaintiff saw her fiancd get hit by a car
while she was traveling directly behind him whereupon he suffered trauma to
his head resulting in his ultimate death).
147. Id.
148. The court noted the Elden opinion from California, supra notes 115-20,
but rejected the reasoning. Id. at 1261. The court stated: "it fails to consider
that there is also no logical distinction between denying recovery to a fiancee
who has lived with her betrothed for seven years and allowing recovery to a
wife who met and married her husband a week before the accident." Id.
149. Id. at 1262.
150. See id. at 1259 (stating that the defendant's argument that "closely
related" should be construed to a dictionary definition would result in a "dry
classification") (citing Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976)).
151. See Santel, supra note 34 (arguing that without boundaries and
requirements imposed on negligent infliction of emotional distress, the
liability stemming from bystander recovery will be too great).
152. Graves, 818 A.2d at 1262.
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defendant from being liable to all individuals who merely see such
an event.
In addition, as stated earlier, the injury to the plaintiff must
be serious and severe. 53' The factors considered in this analysis
include "the intensity and duration of the distress, circumstances
under which the infliction occurred, and the party relationships
involved.""' The determination of this may require the use of
medical technology, or may be "ascertain[ed] by expert medical
testimony"'55 in order to prevent unwarranted relief.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is time for courts to abandon archaic laws and standards
that are no longer justified in today's society.15
Given
advancements in medical science and technology, courts are able
to weed out the fraudulent claims from the truly justified claims.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a viable tort, and
bystanders who suffer its effects deserve compensation.
By
applying their discretion within the foreseeability test, courts will
reach results that are reasonable and just.

153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965) (requiring severe
emotional distress in order to recover). See also Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30
(holding that the distress must be greater than that suffered by a

disinterested witness).
154. Renville v. Fredrickson, 323 Mont. 503, 507 (Mont. 2004) (citing Sacco
v. High County Indep. Press, 896 P.2d 411, 426 (1995)). In Renville, the

mother suffered negligent infliction of emotional distress after her son was
involved in a car accident. Id. However, the court denied relief because the
negligent infliction of emotional distress was not serious and severe enough to

warrant recovery. Id. at 507-08.
155. See Sacco, 896 P.2d at 425 (stating that jurors are also able to

determine the extent of emotional distress by relating the defendant's conduct
to their own experiences) (citations omitted).
156. Id.

